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Abstract
Massive open online courses pose a massive challenge for grading the answerscripts at
a high accuracy. Peer grading is often viewed as a scalable solution to this challenge,
which largely depends on the altruism of the peer graders. Some approaches in the
literature treat peer grading as a best-effort service of the graders, and statistically
correct their inaccuracies before awarding the final scores, but ignore graders’ strate-
gic behavior. Few other approaches incentivize non-manipulative actions of the peer
graders but do not make use of certain additional information that is potentially avail-
able in a peer grading setting, e.g., the true grade can eventually be observed at an
additional cost. This cost can be thought of as an additional effort from the teaching
staff if they had to finally take a look at the corrected papers post peer grading. In this
paper, we use such additional information and introduce a mechanism, TRUPEQA, that
(a) uses a constant number of instructor-graded answerscripts to quantitatively mea-
sure the accuracies of the peer graders and corrects the scores accordingly, (b) ensures
truthful revelation of their observed grades, (c) penalizes manipulation, but not inac-
curacy, and (d) reduces the total cost of arriving at the true grades, i.e., the additional
person-hours of the teaching staff. We show that this mechanism outperforms several
standard peer grading techniques used in practice, even at times when the graders are
non-manipulative.
1 Introduction
Peer evaluation of academic publications is a standard practice for large scientific commu-
nities for many years (Campanario, 1998). In recent years, the massive open online courses
(MOOCs), that has revolutionized classroom teaching, have also started adopting it be-
cause of two major reasons: (a) it saves instructor’s time and yields faster feedback to the
students, and (b) studies have shown that students learn better by checking each others’ an-
swerscripts (Sadler and Good, 2006), among other behavioral and cognitive benefits. These
benefits led majority of the MOOC platforms resort to peer grading for large classes. There
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is, however, an amount of skepticism about the accuracy and ethics of this method. Stud-
ies have found that incorrectly designed peer grading schemes may exhibit grade inflation,
where peer graders give consistent higher grades than that of an instructor (Strong et al.,
2004). Naturally, a body of research has been devoted to make peer grading accurate and
non-manipulable.
The current research on peer grading mechanisms can be broadly classified into three
classes. The first class of literature considers the grades from the peers as their best
effort and use multiple graders’ independent scores of a paper to statistically arrive at
a final score (Hamer et al., 2005; Cho and Schunn, 2007; Piech et al., 2013; Shah et al.,
2013; Pare´ and Joordens, 2008; Kulkarni et al., 2014; De Alfaro and Shavlovsky, 2014;
Raman and Joachims, 2014; Caragiannis et al., 2015; Wright et al., 2015). These approaches
assume that the graders reveal their true observed scores or invest effort to find the true
scores. But without a clear incentive to do so, these mechanisms stand vulnerable to strate-
gic manipulations.
Strategic manipulation is very natural to expect in a large-scale peer grading system
which demands time and effort from the peer graders, and has also been observed in practice
as discussed earlier. An effective peer grading system must protect against such manip-
ulations, and research efforts have been pursued in that end. Hence the second class of
literature in peer grading addresses truthful peer grading approaches through peer predic-
tion mechanisms (Prelec, 2004; Miller et al., 2005; Jurca and Faltings, 2009; Faltings et al.,
2012; Witkowski et al., 2013; Dasgupta and Ghosh, 2013; Witkowski and Parkes, 2013;
Waggoner and Chen, 2014; Shnayder et al., 2016). In peer prediction mechanisms, every
agent is asked to reveal their observed signals, and rewards are designed by comparing each
agent’s report with that of her peers. The reward design ensures truthtelling in the equilib-
rium, i.e., it creates a situation such that every agent has an incentive to invest effort in find-
ing out the correct signal and to reveal it truthfully if she believes that other agents will also
do so. Even if truthful revealing of private signals is an equilibrium, peer prediction methods
induce other uninformative equilibria as well (Jurca and Faltings, 2009; Waggoner and Chen,
2014). If no agent follows the ‘put-effort-and-report-observation’ strategy, it is not beneficial
for an agent to follow it. The operating principle of peer prediction mechanisms is that it re-
wards for coordination, but not for accuracy, and therefore their suitability for settings where
ground truth does exist is limited. In particular, when the information is costly to obtain, it
is generally easier for the agents to resort to an uninformative equilibrium. In more recent
developments, efforts are undertaken to make the truthful equilibrium Pareto dominant in
peer prediction mechanisms, i.e., the truthful equilibrium is (weakly) more rewarding to ev-
ery agent than any other equilibrium (Dasgupta and Ghosh, 2013; Witkowski and Parkes,
2013; Kamble et al., 2015; Radanovic and Faltings, 2015; Shnayder et al., 2016). However,
Gao et al. (2016) show that such arguments rely critically on the assumption that every
agent has access to only one private signal per object, which is untrue in the context of peer
grading.
The final class is a hybrid approach where partial ground truth is accessible and this
is augmented with the peer prediction method. The ground truth can be found either via
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grading a section of the papers by the teaching staff or selectively verifying the grades
of certain peer graded answerscripts. Using this information, schemes can be devised
that reward a grader for agreement with the trusted report (Jurca and Faltings, 2005;
Dasgupta and Ghosh, 2013; Gao et al., 2016). Gao et al. (2016) present the spot checking
mechanism where some selected papers are graded by a trusted authority and a payment
(which can be given to a grader as peer grading bonus scores) is made based on the agreement
with that trusted scores, while for the non-spot-checked papers the payment is a constant.
This scheme ensures truthfulness in dominant strategies. However, this scheme (a) penalizes
an inherent inaccuracy of a grader in the same way as a manipulation, and (b) needs a
number of ground truth papers that increases linearly with the number of students.
Our approach in this paper is closest to the third strand of literature, where we make use
of one additional information, which is motivated by the following observation. If a student
finds that her answerscript has been wrongly graded, she always has an option to appeal to
the instructor. Naturally, no instructor can ignore such a request as the reduction of burden
of grading via peer grading cannot be prioritized over inaccurate grading. Hence, if such
a request comes, the instructor or the teaching assistants have to look into it and provide
the correct grade. However, it will take additional labor from the staff. So, eventually all
true grades will be revealed, but at a cost. Therefore, a reasonable goal of a peer grading
mechanism is to learn these true grades at the minimum cost. Our mechanism is presented
in this premise, and ensures accurate grades with incentives for the peer graders to reveal
their observations truthfully. The mechanism is capable of distinguishing manipulation from
inaccuracy, and does not penalize the latter. It also needs a constant number of ground truth
papers. We provide a brief overview of our approach and results in the following section.
Our Approach and Results
Our approach exploits the fact that, in practice, a peer grading mechanism can extract
more information from the students, who are also graders. For example, the mechanism (a)
can have some graded answerscripts to measure the quality of the graders, and (b) allow
students to report an incorrect grading and correct them with the help of the teaching staff.
Hence, eventually all ‘true’ grades will be obtained, and these information will be used to
deter peer graders from deliberate underperforming. We present the mechanism TRUthful
Peer Evaluation with Quality Assurance (TRUPEQA) in Algorithm 1 that provide the following
theoretical and experimental features and findings. TRUPEQA
⊲ estimates the accuracy of the graders (Alg. 1, Step 4) using a constant number of papers
that are graded by the teaching staff (we call such papers probes).
⊲ incentivizes the graders to grade at the level of the estimated accuracy (Theorem 1).
This method ensures that the mechanism accounts for the inaccuracies of the graders and
penalizes only manipulation and not inaccuracy.
⊲ ensures voluntary participation (Theorem 2).
⊲ minimizes the total cost of revealing the true grades among all mechanisms that use fixed
number of probes, i.e., mechanisms that use partial ground truth (Observation 2).
⊲ on synthetic data, even when graders are non-strategic, interestingly, it yields statistically
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significant lower RMS error than the Gibbs sampling mechanism on the PG1 model of
grader bias and reliability as described in Piech et al. (2013), and also the mean and
median mechanisms. It also receives less fraction of regrading requests compared to those
mechanisms (§6.1.1).
⊲ quite naturally, it performs significantly better when the graders are strategic (§6.1.2).
⊲ both TRUPEQA and Gibbs need the knowledge of priors of the scores. If the prior used by
the mechanism is different from the true prior, the performance of these two mechanisms
are affected. However, Gibbs turns out to be too sensitive to it and the error increases with
increasing reliability, while TRUPEQA continues to perform better as reliability increases
(§6.1.3).
⊲ on a real dataset with discrete model of scores and accuracies, TRUPEQA performs better
on the RMS error (§6.2), even though it is difficult to ascertain whether the graders
manipulated or not.
2 Model
Let [k] , {1, . . . , k}. Let N = [n] be the set of candidates writing the test that will be
peer-graded. Therefore, the set of answerscripts (or papers) and the set of graders are both
denoted by N . We use i as the index for a grader and j as the index for a paper. The set
of graders assigned paper j is denoted by G(j) where G : N 7→ 2N . The true score of paper
j is denoted by yj and the score observed by a grader i ∈ G(j) is denoted by y˜(i)j . The set
of papers graded by grader i is given by G−1(i) , {j ∈ N : i ∈ G(j)}. Both the true scores
and the observed scores belong to the set of scores S which can be continuous or discrete.
Our analyses primarily assume a continuous score set. However, with a little adaptation
the analyses extend to discrete cases as well. The scores yj, j ∈ N are drawn i.i.d. from S
according to a distribution D, which is a common knowledge. The observation of y˜(i)j given
yj by the graders i ∈ G(j) is governed by the error model f(y˜(i)j | yj; θ) (for a discrete S,
this is the probability mass function p(y˜
(i)
j | yj; θ)), which is the density of y˜(i)j given yj and
θ is the parameter of the error model, which we will call accuracy. Let Θ denote the set of
all possible accuracies.
We consider the premise of peer-grading mechanisms where ℓ(< n) papers are checked by
the teaching staff, and the grades provided are assumed to be the ground truth. Denote the
set of such ground truth papers by P ⊂ N, |P | = ℓ, and call it the set of probe papers. The
true grades of these probe papers are known to the mechanism designer (e.g., the instructor
of the course), but these scores are not ex-ante revealed to the peer-graders. Each grader is
given the probe and non-probe papers in two batches. The mechanisms we consider estimate
the accuracy θ from the performance of the graders on these probe papers in batch one, and
use it to predict the score of a non-probe paper in batch two. The mechanisms we consider
allow the graders to know the identities of the probe papers and the true scores ex-post their
grading, with which their estimated accuracies are also released. With such information
released, the mechanism design goal is to ensure that a rational grader continues to operate
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at the same estimated accuracy and report the observations truthfully.1
An estimation rule is given by the vector e , (e1, . . . , en), with ei : S
|P∩G−1(i)| ×
S |P∩G
−1(i)| 7→ Θ, which is the function that estimates the accuracy of grader i from the probe
papers she corrects. Hence if agent i reports the scores y˜
(i)
j for the papers j ∈ P ∩ G−1(i)
while the true scores of those papers are yj, j ∈ P ∩ G−1(i), her accuracy is given by
ei(y˜
(i)
P∩G−1(i),yP∩G−1(i)). We assume that G(j) 6= ∅, ∀j ∈ N , P ∩ G−1(i) 6= ∅, ∀i ∈ N ,
and G−1(i) \ P 6= ∅, ∀i ∈ N , i.e., every paper is graded by at least one grader, and every
grader grades at least one probe and one non-probe paper. We consider the estimation rule
to be standard and publicly announced beforehand. Therefore, it is not part of the mecha-
nism. However, we will see that its role is crucial while defining the notions of truthfulness
and voluntary participation.
For notational simplicity, we will use the following shorthands for grader i: Pi = P ∩
G−1(i) for the probe papers assigned to i, NPi = G
−1(i) \ P for the non-probe papers
assigned to i, qi = ei(y˜
(i)
Pi
,yPi) for the estimated accuracy, and CGi = ∪j∈NPiG(j) for the set
of co-graders who grade at least one common non-probe paper with i. The set of accuracies
is denoted by Q.
We assume that the true score vector y , (y1, . . . , yn) is eventually observed at a cost.
Define, C(xj, yj) to be the cost of observing true score yj when a score of xj was (possibly
incorrectly) given to paper j. We argue that this is quite natural in the context of peer-
grading. Even though a paper might be incorrectly graded, the student has an option
to appeal – in which case, the teaching staff gets involved and does a correct grading –
but this happens at an additional cost, captured by the function C. An example of C is
one that increases in the difference |xj − yj| and is zero when xj = yj.2 The reward to
the designer is denoted by the function R, and is defined as the negative of the cost, i.e.,
R(xj , yj) = −C(xj , yj). The total reward for a collection of papers is additive over individual
rewards. With a little abuse of notation we denote the reward for the papers in T with R
as well, i.e., R(xT ,yT ) =
∑
j∈T R(xj , yj).
A peer-grading mechanism M for a given estimation rule e is therefore given by the tuple
〈G, r, t〉, where
⊲ G is grader set assignment function, as defined before.
⊲ r , (rj : j ∈ N \ P ), with rj : S |G(j)| ×Q|G(j)| 7→ S, which is the function that computes
the scores of the non-probe papers from the scores reported by the graders and their
accuracies. Hence, the score decided by the mechanism for paper j is rj(y˜
G(j)
j ,qG(j)) , xj
when the graders submit y˜
G(j)
j and the estimated accuracy vector is qG(j).
⊲ t , (ti : i ∈ N), with ti : Sn × Sn × Qn 7→ R, which denotes the function that yields
the transfer (or payment) to grader i, and is a function of the given and true scores of
the papers, and the accuracies of the graders. Hence, the transfer ti(xN ,yN ,qN) is a real
1However, in a more realistic scenario, such a complete information of batch one may not be released,
which further limits the possibility of manipulation by the grader. We show that even with this information
available, truthful mechanisms can be designed, which also helps distinguish error with manipulation.
2If a student’s true score is far from the given score, then the teaching staff needs to check a larger
portion of the answerscript, leading to a larger cost.
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number, where xj is the score given to paper j by the mechanism. For continuous scores,
a scaled value of the transfer can be directly added to the total score as bonus marks for
peer-grading, while for discrete, the transfer has to be awarded separately.
It is reasonable to assume j /∈ G(j), ∀j ∈ N , as the usual practice in peer-grading is to
not assign j her own paper for grading. Therefore the score received by agent j, i.e., rj ,
is independent of her reported grades y˜
(j)
G−1(j). The transfer is the only factor influenced by
her report, and one of our mechanism design goals is to choose this transfer such that it
incentivizes the agent to report her observations truthfully.
We assume that every student cares only for her score in the examination given by the
mechanism and the transfer (e.g., the bonus marks) from peer grading. Among these, the
score received is independent of her grading, and hence non-manipulable. Therefore, we
consider the only potentially manipulable part of the payoff, the transfer, for our analysis.
For agent i in mechanism M = 〈G, r, t〉, this is given by
uMi (y˜
CGi
NPi
,yNPi ,qCGi) = ti((rj(y˜
G(j)
j ,qG(j)) : j ∈ NPi),yNPi,qCGi). (1)
The payoff captures the fact that a grader is paid only for the non-probe papers she checks,
and the payment is dependent on the score given by the mechanism to those papers, the true
score of the papers, and the accuracies of the co-graders. The score given by the mechanism
to a paper is also dependent on the reported scores of the other graders who grade the same
paper.
Note that there can be a cost of grading the papers for agent i, which we have ignored in
our model for simplicity. However, in certain setups, the cost of grading a paper is typically
known and can be added to the transfer. All our analyses will continue to hold even in that
setting. The setting where the cost is dependent on the accuracy of a grader is a different
research question which we leave as a future work.
The reported scores of grader i, given by y˜
(i)
G−1(i), is decomposable into the probe and
non-probe components, i.e., y˜
(i)
G−1(i) = (y˜
(i)
Pi
, y˜
(i)
NPi
). Since the estimation function e is publicly
known, agent i knows that her accuracy will be estimated as ei(y˜
(i)
Pi
,yPi) = qi, when the true
scores of the probes, yPi, is made public by the designer. The strategy agent i can consider is
whether to report the scores of the non-probe papers y˜
(i)
NPi
according to the distribution given
by the same accuracy level, i.e., according to f(y˜
(i)
NPi
| yNPi ; qi), or something different. Our
mechanism design goal is to ensure that the graders continue grading the non-probe papers
with the same accuracy level estimated via the probes. This is captured in the definition of
truthfulness as follows.
Definition 1 (Equal Intensity Incentive Compatibility (EIIC)) Consider grader
i ∈ N . Let qCGi = (qk : k ∈ CGi), where qk = ek(y˜(k)Pk ,yPk). A mech-
anism M = 〈G, r, t〉 is equal intensity incentive compatible (EIIC) if for all
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i ∈ N, ∀y˜(k)Pk ,yPk ∈ S |Pk|, ∀k ∈ CGi, yˆ
(i)
NPi
∈ S |NPi|,
E
y˜
(i)
NPi
,y˜
CGi\{i}
NPi
,yNPi | qCGi
uMi ((y˜
(i)
NPi
, y˜
CGi\{i}
NPi
),yNPi,qCGi)
> E
y˜
(i)
NPi
,y˜
CGi\{i}
NPi
,yNPi | qCGi
uMi ((yˆ
(i)
NPi
, y˜
CGi\{i}
NPi
),yNPi,qCGi).
(2)
Where y˜
(i)
NPi
is drawn from the distribution f(y˜
(i)
NPi
| yNPi , qi), and y˜CGi\{i}NPi is drawn from the
distribution f(y˜
CGi\{i}
NPi
| yNPi,qCGi\{i}).
Note that the inequality of Equation (2) should hold for every reported score vector y˜
(i)
Pi
on
the probe papers of i. The expectation of the utility is taken w.r.t. the accuracy estimated
from this reported score vector. The definition says that for a mechanism to be EIIC, every
agent should receive maximum expected payoff if she grades the non-probe papers assigned
to her with the same accuracy as estimated from the probe papers, which takes into account
that the graders could be inaccurate. Note that this definition also assumes that the other co-
graders of i draw their scores according to the accuracies estimated from their scores on their
respective probe papers. Therefore, this notion of incentive compatibility is close in spirit
to the ex-post incentive compatibility notion in literature (Mezzetti, 2004; Nath and Zoeter,
2013; Bhat et al., 2014), which is the best achievable truthfulness guarantee in this setting
of interdependent valuations due to the impossibility result by Jehiel et al. (2006).
EIIC is subtly different from the expectation computed w.r.t. the graders’ true accuracies.
It is unlikely that a grader will perfectly know her true accuracy, i.e., the probability of
observing y˜
(i)
j when the true score is yj. Rather if the performance of a grader is evaluated
on some training set, and is shown to the grader, she can decide whether to continue at the
same level of estimated accuracy (by putting similar effort for grading) or not. EIIC ensures
that working at the level of estimated accuracy on the non-probe papers is a better option
in expectation.
Also, EIIC ensures a little stronger guarantee than is required in an actual setting of
peer grading (see paragraph 2 of Section 2 and footnote1). In practice, the true scores of the
probe papers and the estimated accuracies of the graders may not be released before they
check the non-probe papers, leading to a more restricted set of manipulation strategies of
the graders.3
Our next definition ensures that every peer-grader willfully participates in this mecha-
nism, as the expected payoff from participating truthfully is non-negative.
Definition 2 (Ex-Post Individual Rationality (EPIR)) Consider grader i ∈ N . Let
qCGi = (qk : k ∈ CGi), where qk = ek(y˜(k)Pk ,yPk). A mechanism M = 〈G, r, t〉 is ex-post
individually rational (EPIR) if for all i ∈ N, ∀y˜(k)Pk ,yPk ∈ S |Pk|, ∀k ∈ CGi,
E
y˜
(i)
NPi
,y˜
CGi\{i}
NPi
,yNPi | qCGi
uMi ((y˜
(i)
NPi
, y˜
CGi\{i}
NPi
),yNPi,qCGi) > 0. (3)
3This is not unusual in mechanism design, e.g., dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms are
designed even though agents may never know the reported types of the other agents.
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Where y˜
(i)
NPi
is drawn from the distribution f(y˜
(i)
NPi
| yNPi , qi), and y˜CGi\{i}NPi is drawn from the
distribution f(y˜
CGi\{i}
NPi
| yNPi,qCGi\{i}).
The goal of the instructor in a peer-grading context is to minimize the expected cost, which
is equivalent to maximizing the expected reward. Ideally, the cost is zero if the scores given
by a mechanism is equal to the true scores for each paper. This can be interpreted as though
the paper does not come back to the teaching staff for regrading, and therefore the peer-
graded score is the final score for the paper. Therefore, the following property is essential
for any reasonable peer-grading mechanism.
Definition 3 (Expected Reward Maximizer (ERM)) Let qN = (qi : i ∈ N), where
qi = ei(y˜
(i)
Pi
,yPi). The score computing function r of a mechanism M is expected reward
maximizer (ERM) if for every reported score vector y˜NN\P for non-probe papers, and for every
estimated accuracy vector qN , it maximizes the expected reward, i.e.,
r∗(y˜NN\P ,qN) ∈ argmax
xN\P∈S|N\P |
EyN\P | y˜
N
N\P
;qN
R(xN\P ,yN\P ). (4)
Since the reward is only limited to the non-probe papers, the expectation is calculated based
on the scores reported and the true score of those papers. Let the ERM given by Equation (4)
be denoted by r∗ = (r∗j : j ∈ N \ P ). Note that, since the reward function is additive over
the papers, i.e., R(xN\P ,yN\P ) =
∑
j∈N\P R(xj , yj), the decision problem of Equation (4) is
also decomposable. Hence the ERM score for every paper j ∈ N \ P is given by
r∗j (y˜
G(j)
j ,qG(j)) ∈ argmax
xj∈S
E
yj | y˜
G(j)
j ;qG(j)
R(xj , yj). (5)
The reward at the ERM score for paper j when the true score is yj is denoted by
W ∗j (y˜
G(j)
j ,qG(j), yj) = R(r
∗
j (y˜
G(j)
j ,qG(j)), yj). (6)
Define a the ERM score of paper j in the absence of agent i ∈ G(j) to be
r
(−i)∗
j (y˜
G(j)\{i}
j ,qG(j)\{i}) ∈ argmax
xj∈S
E
yj | y˜
G(j)\{i}
j ;qG(j)\{i}
R(xj , yj). (7)
The reward at the ERM score for paper j in the absence of agent i ∈ G(j) when the true
score is yj is denoted by
W
(−i)∗
j (y˜
G(j)\{i}
j ,qG(j)\{i}, yj) = R(r
(−i)∗
j (y˜
G(j)\{i}
j ,qG(j)\{i}), yj). (8)
We will use the shorthandsW ∗j andW
(−i)∗
j for the above two expressions when the arguments
of such functions are clear from the context.
We are now in a position to present the central mechanism of this paper.
8
3 The TRUPEQA mechanism
In this section, we present our mechanism TRUPEQA (TRUthful Peer Evaluation with Quality
Assurance), that (1) decides the assignment of the papers to the graders, (2) selects the score
for every paper, and (3) decides the transfer to every grader. Algorithm 1 shows the details
of the steps, while Figure 1 shows the dependencies of different variables graphically using
a multi-agent influence diagram (MAID) (Koller and Milch, 2003). The operating principle
Algorithm 1 TRUPEQA
1: Input: reported scores y˜NP of the graders on the probe papers – reported after Step 3,
and reported scores y˜NN\P on the non-probe papers – reported after Step 4
2: Given: the size of the probe set |P | = ℓ, the estimation function e, the priors on
yj, ∀j ∈ N
3: G part: every grader i ∈ N is assigned K (even) papers to grade, K
2
of which are probe
papers and rest are non-probe, in such a way that every non-probe papers is assigned
to exactly K
2
graders. The assignment of papers to graders also ensures that the grader
does not get her own paper assigned to her.
4: The accuracies qi, i ∈ N are estimated by applying ei on their Pi papers, and are revealed
to the graders.
5: r part: the scores of the papers are given by the ERM r∗ (Equation (4)), which is
equivalent to the scores given by the decomposed ERM r∗j (Equation (5)) for every
j ∈ N \ P .
6: t part: the transfer to grader i for grading paper j ∈ NPi is given by W ∗j −W (−i)∗j and
the total transfer to grader i is therefore ti =
∑
j∈NPi
(W ∗j −W (−i)∗j ).
of this mechanism is to assign equal number of papers to the graders and pick the score of
a paper such that the expected cost (w.r.t. the estimated accuracy of all the graders who
graded this paper) is minimized. Finally, the transfer is the marginal contribution of the
grader towards minimizing this cost. In the next section, we show that these features of
TRUPEQA satisfy some desirable properties of peer grading.
4 Properties of TRUPEQA
By the observation of Equation (5), we have that the joint problem of finding the score
vector of all the papers to maximize the expected reward (Equation (4)) is equivalent to
the problem to scoring the papers individually with the same objective. Similarly, since the
transfer to grader i in TRUPEQA is additive over all the papers she grades (Step 6 of Alg. 1),
we see that the questions of incentive compatibility and individual rationality are completely
decomposable into the questions at the individual paper levels.
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Figure 1: Multi-agent influence diagram for TRUPEQA.
Observation 1 (Decomposability) If TRUPEQA satisfies the inequalities given by Defini-
tions 1 and 2 individually for every paper j ∈ N \ P , i.e., they hold when NPi = j, ∀j ∈
G−1(i), and ∀i ∈ N , it is sufficient to conclude that TRUPEQA is EIIC and EPIR.
With the above observation, we proceed to proving the main results of this section.
Theorem 1 (EIIC) TRUPEQA is EIIC.
Proof : Pick arbitrary i ∈ N and j ∈ NPi. Define tij = W ∗j −W (−i)∗j to be the transfer
to grader i for grading paper j under TRUPEQA. Since i is arbitrary, by Observation 1, it is
sufficient to show that the inequalities given by Equation (2) hold after replacing the utility
with the transfer term and the NPi term with a single paper j. Formally, we need to show
that ∀y˜(k)Pk ,yPk ∈ S |Pk|, ∀k ∈ G(j), yˆ
(i)
j ∈ S,
E
y˜
(i)
j ,y˜
G(j)\{i}
j ,yj | qG(j)
tij((y˜
(i)
j , y˜
G(j)\{i}
j ), yj,qG(j))
> E
y˜
(i)
j ,y˜
G(j)\{i}
j ,yj | qG(j)
tij((yˆ
(i)
j , y˜
G(j)\{i}
j ), yj,qG(j)).
(9)
Where y˜
(i)
j is drawn from the distribution f(y˜
(i)
j | yj , qi), and y˜G(j)\{i}j is drawn from the
distribution f(y˜
G(j)\{i}
j | yj,qG(j)\{i}), while yˆ(i)j is any arbitrary score.
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It is easy to see thatW
(−i)∗
j is independent of the report of agent i by definition. Therefore
in order to prove the inequality of Equation (9), it is sufficient to show that
E
y˜
(i)
j ,y˜
G(j)\{i}
j ,yj | qG(j)
W ∗j (y˜
(i)
j , y˜
G(j)\{i}
j ,qG(j), yj)
> E
y˜
(i)
j ,y˜
G(j)\{i}
j ,yj | qG(j)
W ∗j (yˆ
(i)
j , y˜
G(j)\{i}
j ,qG(j), yj). (10)
Consider the LHS of the above inequality
E
y˜
(i)
j ,y˜
G(j)\{i}
j ,yj | qG(j)
W ∗j (y˜
(i)
j , y˜
G(j)\{i}
j ,qG(j), yj)
= E
y˜
(i)
j
,y˜
G(j)\{i}
j
,yj | qG(j)
R(r∗j (y˜
G(j)
j ,qG(j)), yj)
= E
y˜
(i)
j ,y˜
G(j)\{i}
j | qG(j)
(
E
yj | y˜
(i)
j ,y˜
G(j)\{i}
j ,qG(j)
R(r∗j (y˜
G(j)
j ,qG(j)), yj)
)
> E
y˜
(i)
j ,y˜
G(j)\{i}
j | qG(j)
(
E
yj | y˜
(i)
j ,y˜
G(j)\{i}
j ,qG(j)
R(r∗j (yˆ
(i)
j , y˜
G(j)\{i}
j ,qG(j)), yj)
)
= E
y˜
(i)
j ,y˜
G(j)\{i}
j ,yj | qG(j)
R(r∗j (yˆ
(i)
j , y˜
G(j)\{i}
j ,qG(j)), yj)
= E
y˜
(i)
j
,y˜
G(j)\{i}
j
,yj | qG(j)
W ∗j (yˆ
(i)
j , y˜
G(j)\{i}
j ,qG(j), yj).
The first equality is obtained by substituting the values from Equation (6). The second equal-
ity holds due to the chain rule of probability. The inequality holds by definition of r∗j (Equa-
tion (5)). The term within the parentheses is maximized when r∗j operates on y˜
G(j)
j which is
generated from the actual distribution perceived by agent i, i.e., f(yj | y˜(i)j , y˜G(j)\{i}j ,qG(j)).
The inequality holds for any r on the RHS, in particular, for r∗j (yˆ
(i)
j , y˜
G(j)\{i}
j ,qG(j)). The
last two equalities hold by reorganizing the chain rule and the definition of W ∗. Hence, we
have obtained Equation (10) and the proof is complete. 
Our next result shows that every grader has a non-negative utility from participating in the
peer-grading exercise.
Theorem 2 (EPIR) TRUPEQA is EPIR.
Proof : Pick arbitrary i ∈ N and j ∈ NPi. Define tij = W ∗j −W (−i)∗j to be the transfer
to grader i for grading paper j under TRUPEQA. Since i is arbitrary, by Observation 1, it is
sufficient to show that the inequalities given by Equation (3) hold after replacing the utility
with the transfer term and the NPi term with a single paper j. Formally, we need to show
that ∀y˜(k)Pk ,yPk ∈ S |Pk|, ∀k ∈ G(j), yˆ
(i)
j ∈ S,
E
y˜
(i)
j ,y˜
G(j)\{i}
j ,yj | qG(j)
tij((y˜
(i)
j , y˜
G(j)\{i}
j ), yj,qG(j)) > 0. (11)
Where y˜
(i)
j is drawn from the distribution f(y˜
(i)
j | yj , qi), and y˜G(j)\{i}j is drawn from the
distribution f(y˜
G(j)\{i}
j | yj,qG(j)\{i}), while yˆ(i)j is any arbitrary score.
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Substituting for tij and the expressions of W
∗,W (−i)∗ from Equations (6) and (8), we get
the first equality below.
E
y˜
(i)
j ,y˜
G(j)\{i}
j ,yj | qG(j)
tij((y˜
(i)
j , y˜
G(j)\{i}
j ), yj,qG(j))
= E
y˜
(i)
j ,y˜
G(j)\{i}
j ,yj | qG(j)
(
R(r∗j (y˜
G(j)
j ,qG(j)), yj)
− R(r(−i)∗j (y˜G(j)\{i}j ,qG(j)\{i}), yj)
)
= E
y˜
(i)
j ,y˜
G(j)\{i}
j | qG(j)
(
E
yj | y˜
(i)
j ,y˜
G(j)\{i}
j ,qG(j)
(
R(r∗j (y˜
G(j)
j ,qG(j)), yj)
− R(r(−i)∗j (y˜G(j)\{i}j ,qG(j)\{i}), yj)
))
> 0.
The second equality holds by the chain rule of probability. The inequality holds by definition
of r∗j (Equation (5)). The first term within the inner parentheses is maximized when r
∗
j
operates on y˜
G(j)
j which is generated from the actual distribution perceived by agent i, i.e.,
f(yj | y˜(i)j , y˜G(j)\{i}j ,qG(j)). The expected reward at r∗ is therefore no smaller than that at
any r, in particular, for r
(−i)∗
j (y˜
G(j)\{i}
j ,qG(j)\{i}). Hence, we have obtained Equation (11)
and the proof is complete. 
EIIC and EPIR make sure that reporting the observed scores according to the estimated
accuracy is a best response of a grader if the other graders behave in a similar fashion.
These guarantees are less vulnerable than the uninformative equilibria problem of the peer
prediction mechanisms, because (a) TRUPEQA accounts for the inaccuracies of the graders via
probe papers, and (b) the payment is contingent on the true grades that are finally revealed.
These two occurrences, which are beyond the graders’ control and has close proximity to the
ground truth, keep the graders’ options of manipulation restricted. The following observation
follows from the fact that the mechanism chooses the score to minimize the expected cost
(Step 5).
Observation 2 (Expected Cost Minimizer) Among all mechanisms using fixed number
of probe papers, TRUPEQA minimizes the total cost of rechecking.
5 Relationship with some classic mechanisms
The transfer term of TRUPEQA, given by step 6 of Algorithm 1, resembles the payments of
certain classic mechanisms in the independent and interdependent valuations setup. The
first of them is the pivotal payment of Vickery-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (Vickrey,
1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973), and we explain here that TRUPEQA is quite a different
mechanism than the VCG. In classical quasi-linear model the decision of the designer affects
the utility of the agents via the valuation function. But in this setting, the valuation, which
is the cost of grading and is assumed to be zero has no dependency on the decision made by
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the designer – the decision here is the final score of a graded paper. For the same reason,
TRUPEQA is also different from the two stage mechanism by Mezzetti (2004), which applies
to the setting of interdependent valuations. The decision of the mechanism, i.e., r∗ (step 5
of Algorithm 1), affects the payoff of a grader via the transfer. The transfer is designed in
such a way that the objective of the planner is aligned with the payoff of the graders. In
other words, the designer makes the graders partner in his goal of maximizing the expected
reward. The W
(−i)∗
j term is subtracted to ensure that the bonus scores for peer grading is
not too high yet individual rationality is satisfied. The QUEST mechanism (Bhat et al., 2014)
is the closest in structure of the choice of decision and transfers of TRUPEQA, and applies to
the setting of truthful crowdsourcing. The major differences of TRUPEQA from QUEST are (a)
in the latter the choice of agents assigned to a task is also decided by solving an optimization
problem, while in the former it is fixed, and (b) QUEST assumes that the agents know their
qualities perfectly and report them to the designer, while in TRUPEQA, the mechanism runs
only on the reported scores and qualities are only estimated, which also leads to a different
incentive compatibility guarantee for this mechanism.
6 Empirical evaluation
Section 4 shows that TRUPEQA satisfies two very desirable properties in the context of peer-
grading – truthfulness and voluntary participation. However, the grading accuracy – how
close the peer-decided score is from the true score – of the peer-graded answerscripts is an
important metric for measuring the efficacy of a mechanism. This metric is also correlated
with the cost of rechecking the answerscripts and the number of answerscripts that ask
for regrading. To complement our theoretical investigation of TRUPEQA, in this section, we
consider an empirical evaluation of the mechanism on the aspect of grading accuracy, and
compare it with some standard peer-grading protocols on both synthetic and real datasets.
We also consider strategic aspects of peer grading and conduct a separate evaluation when
the graders manipulate. The standard peer grading protocols assume that the graders submit
their grades truthfully and our experiments show that accuracy is affected when graders are
strategic.
The rest of this section is organized into two parts. In part one, we consider continuous
scores, generate the data from a given prior, and use a well-known error model for the peer-
graders. In part two, we consider a real dataset from a peer-graded course (Vozniuk et al.,
2014) and adapt the error model for such a setting. In both the cases, we consider the
following metrics: (1) grading accuracy, i.e., the root mean square (RMS) error of the grades,
(2) fraction of the answerscripts requesting regrading, i.e., the fraction of papers for which
the peer-graded score is not within a threshold of the true score, and compare them with
that of the standard mechanisms. While the RMS error gives an aggregate view of the
inaccuracy of the peer-grading mechanism, the regrading fraction gives a per-student view
of the inaccuracy. The mechanisms considered (except TRUPEQA) are (a) mean, where every
answerscript is graded by multiple peers and the mean is taken as the peer-graded score, (b)
median, which is similar to (a) except the median is taken as the peer-graded score, and (c)
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Gibbs sampling on the PG1 model of grader bias and reliability as described in Piech et al.
(2013).
Two other closely related peer-grading mechanisms are the spot checking (SC) (Gao et al.,
2016) and the correlated agreement (CA) (Shnayder et al., 2016) mechanisms. The SC mech-
anism randomly picks a group of peer-graded papers and verifies the scores – a method called
spot checking. The graders are rewarded or penalized depending on their agreement with
the spot-checked papers. For other papers, the payment is constant. This mechanism satis-
fies truthfulness in dominant strategies. The CA mechanism uses a peer prediction method
(discussed in §1) that incentivizes truth-telling in an equilibrium. The novelty of both these
algorithms is entirely on the truthfulness aspect as they omit how the peer scores are aggre-
gated into the final scores. Therefore, it may be assumed that they use one of the standard
aggregation techniques against which we already compare our mechanism.
6.1 Simulation with continuous scores
For the generation of the true scores and the error model of the peer-graders, we use the
PG1 model of grader bias and reliability as described in Piech et al. (2013), which is a
widely used model for continuous scores. This model assumes that the true score yj for
paper j is distributed as N (µ, 1/γ), for all j ∈ N , the reliability τi and bias bi for a grader
i are distributed as G(α, β) and N (0, 1/η) respectively, for all i ∈ N – where G and N are
gamma and normal distributions respectively. The observed score of paper j by grader i,
given by y˜
(i)
j , is distributed as N (yj+ bi, 1/τi). The model parameters α, β, µ, γ, η are chosen
appropriately to reflect a realistic peer grading scenario.
In traditional examinations, the scores typically lie between 0 and 100. The parameters of
the above model are chosen in our experiment to compress this score spread within a width of
1. The value of µ = 1 and γ = 16 implies that the true score comes from the prior N (1, 1/16)
which ensures that 95% of the score values lie within [0.5, 1.5] with mean 1. Since bias is de-
fined as the constant shift from true score, a value of η = 1600/9 ensures that 95% of the bias
values lies in the range [−0.15, 0.15] with mean 0, i.e., about a maximum of 15 marks shift
in a traditional examination. Similarly, η = 400 gives the range of [−0.1, 0.1] for bias. Reli-
ability is defined as the inverse of the variance of the noise of the score observed by a grader
after the bias is added to the true score. The reliability parameters, α and β, are chosen
such that 95% of the noise varies within [−0.08, 0.08], [−0.06, 0.06], [−0.04, 0.04], [−0.02, 0.02]
respectively for the mean of reliabilities 625, 1111.11, 2500, 10000. The variation of the noise
is comparable to a maximum variation of 8 marks to 2 marks in traditional examination,
i.e., reliability increases.
In the simulations, we consider n = 500. The true grade of paper j, given by yj, and agent
i’s observation y˜
(i)
j are generated according to the above model, for all i, j ∈ N . For every
grader i ∈ N , the accuracy parameters (bi, τi) are estimated via maximum likelihood estimate
given y˜
(i)
j , yj for all j ∈ Pi. The reward function R is given by: R(xj , yj) , −(xj−yj)2, where
xj is the score decided by an algorithm and yj is the true score. In the following sections, we
consider three different assumptions on the graders’ behavior and the mechanism’s knowledge
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of prior that impact the accuracy of the mechanism and the number of regrading requests.
6.1.1 Graders are truthful
For TRUPEQA, we use ℓ = 50 papers as probe. Papers are distributed such that each student
gets 10 papers to grade, where 5 are probe and 5 are non-probe. Each non-probe paper
is also graded by at least 5 graders. The ERM r∗j is calculated according to Equation (5).
Finally the root mean squared (RMS) error between r∗N\P and yN\P is computed. We provide
the calculations to find the expressions of estimated accuracies, the posterior of yj given the
observations, and the decomposed ERM r∗j in Appendix A for a cleaner presentation.
The Gibbs setup uses Gibbs sampling on the PG1 model of grader bias and reliability
as described in Piech et al. (2013). The grades given by mechanisms mean and median are
the mean and median respectively of y˜
G(j)
j , for each paper j ∈ N \ P .
We choose the threshold for regrading request to be 0.005, i.e., paper j comes back for
regrading if the decided score xj by a mechanism satisfies |xj − yj | > 0.005.
For every mean reliability, true grades are randomly generated 10 times and for each
true grade, observations according to the parameters are repeated 10 times. The average
performances of the four algorithms discussed above are shown in Figures 2a and 2b (RMS
error) for two different values of η, and in Figures 3a and 3b (fraction of papers requested
for regrading) with 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 2: RMS errors for different mechanisms – truthful graders
6.1.2 Graders are strategic
As discussed before, Gibbs, mean, and median mechanisms assume that the peer-graders
reveal the scores truthfully, while TRUPEQA incentivizes the graders to reveal their scores
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Figure 3: Fraction of regrading requests for different mechanisms – truthful graders
truthfully. In this section, we investigate a scenario where a peer-grader adopts the following
manipulative strategy: (1) if the observed score of the paper being graded is above the
grader’s true score, then the grader deliberately reports a score for the paper which is equal
to her own score. Note that, this assumption does not always need that the grader knows
her score perfectly. Rather, it is sufficient to assume that the grader can identify that the
questions that she has answered incorrectly and the paper she is grading has answered them
correctly. (2) If the observed score of the paper being graded is below the grader’s true score,
then the grader reports her observed score truthfully.
We feel that this sort of manipulation is quite natural in the context of peer grading,
particularly if a mechanism does not provide an incentive for grading papers correctly. Three
of the mechanisms discussed, i.e., Gibbs, mean, and median, are fragile since the graders
lose nothing even if they adopt this manipulation strategy. However, in TRUPEQA, such
manipulation can lead to a lower expected payoff. Therefore, in this strategic setup we
consider the truthful reports for TRUPEQA, but consider the effects of the manipulation for
the other three mechanisms. The average performances of the four mechanisms with this
manipulative strategy are shown in Figures 4a and 4b (RMS error) for the same values of η
with 95% confidence interval.
6.1.3 Truthful graders, mismatched prior
TRUPEQA and Gibbs need the prior of the scores for its operation. In the previous set of
experiments, we have used the prior for the mechanisms to be the true prior of the scores
from which the true scores are generated. For example, if the true score yj is drawn from
N (µ, 1/γ), both TRUPEQA and Gibbs mechanisms used the prior with same parameters. This
is because we assumed that the prior is a common knowledge. In reality, the designer’s
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Figure 4: RMS errors for different mechanisms for strategic graders
knowledge about the prior can be (i) shifted in the mean, or (ii) the variance could be larger
or smaller, among other possible errors. Figures 5a and 5b show the average performances of
the mechanisms of the two cases (1) there is a positive bias in the prior’s mean, but variance
is same as that of the true prior, and (2) the prior’s variance is larger, but the mean is same
as the true prior. The results of the other two cases, (3) negative bias in mean, and (4)
prior’s variance is smaller, are similar to (1) and (2) respectively, and are skipped.
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Figure 5: RMS errors for mismatched priors
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6.2 Discrete scores and a real dataset
In this section, we test the performance of these algorithms on a real dataset. We use the
dataset of a course as given by Vozniuk et al. (2014). As mentioned in that paper, the data
were collected in the following manner. There were few evaluation criteria defined for the
graders to grade and the scores (both true and reported) can only be from a discrete set
{1, . . . , 5}, with 5 being the best and 1 being the worst. The dataset contains (a) the true
grades given by the instructor and the teaching staff, (b) the grades given by peer graders,
and (c) the mapping of the papers to graders.
Since the dataset gives scores from a discrete set, we need to update the model of the
true score generation and the grading error of the graders. We consider a model where the
distribution of the true score yj is given by the probability mass function (PMF) p, and the
accuracy of grader i is given by a real number qi. The support of yj, y˜
(i)
j is S = {0, 1, . . . , m}
for every grader i and paper j. Let Q denote the support of qi, ∀i ∈ N . The error model is
given by,4
p(y˜
(i)
j | yj, qi) =
exp
(
− qi|y˜
(i)
j −yj |
m
)
∑m
z=0
(
exp
(
− qi|z−yj |
m
)) . (12)
The dataset scores are shifted from {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} to {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} to match to our model.
Hence, for the dataset, m = 4. The support of Q is uniformly partitioned into 100 points
within range [0, 16]. An accuracy of qi = 0 implies that it is very low and she gives uniformly
random grade to every student, while qi = 16 implies that the grader’s observed score equals
the true score w.p. at least 95%. In this setting, we do not have a closed form expression for
estimated qi and r
∗
j for TRUPEQA, and the steps of the Gibbs sampling. We use the discrete
set Q, partition it finely, and do an exhaustive search to estimate the accuracy.
The prior distribution of true score and quality is assumed to be uniform over S and Q
respectively, i.e., for every paper j and grader i
p(yj = k) =
1
|S| , ∀k ∈ S, p(qi = z) =
1
|Q| , ∀z ∈ Q.
The details of the calculations of the discrete version of TRUPEQA and Gibbs sampling of the
PG1 are presented in Appendices B and C respectively.
The dataset has 60 assignments, each of which is graded by multiple peer graders. To-
gether it has 1347 grades, but not every grader checks the same number of papers. Also,
there is no common set of papers, which we can treat as probe, that are checked by all the
graders. Therefore, to apply TRUPEQA on this dataset, we treat the first 5 checked papers
of each grader as the probe papers, estimate their accuracies from those, and treat the rest
4It may be more accurate to model the accuracy by introducing more parameters. However, the esti-
mation part of peer-grading relies on limited data and estimating many parameters from less data could be
highly erroneous.
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of the papers checked by her as the non-probe papers. For Gibbs, the initial guess of qi is
generated uniformly over Q. Both these mechanisms use the prior information of yj. In the
experiment, we consider the cases when the prior used by the mechanism is (a) the same as
the true prior, and (b) uniform over S. The average performances of TRUPEQA and Gibbs
are shown in Figure 6a (RMS error) and Figure 6b (fraction of regrading requests) with
95% confidence interval. Mean and median mechanisms have no randomization. Hence their
plots are deterministic.
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Figure 6: RMS errors and regrading requests for different mechanisms in the discrete setting
Few comments are in order. TRUPEQA performs statistically significantly better in terms
of the RMS error and fraction of regrading requests among all the mechanisms. It is a bit
surprising that it performs better even in a non-strategic setting. We feel that this is perhaps
because of the fact that TRUPEQA estimates the accuracies and inverts the score given by the
graders to arrive at a more refined score, albeit at a higher cost. Gibbs, on the other hand,
starts with an initial guess of the parameters, and stops after an initial burn-off period, and
averages the scores given by the samples generated with those parameters. In the experiment,
we used the number of iterations and burn-off periods as prescribed in Piech et al. (2013).
We guess that if the burn-off period can be made larger, the errors may decrease.
In the real dataset, it is difficult to predict whether the graders manipulated the scores or
not. The error model we adopted for the discrete scores does not have any bias component
and therefore the Gibbs algorithm has less parameters to estimate. This should have led
Gibbs, after the initial burn-off period, to estimate the parameters more accurately, and it
possibly could perform better that TRUPEQA. But from the observed results, it seems that
the parameters could not be estimated accurately, which hints at some amount of manipu-
lation in the reported scores. A human subject experiment with TRUPEQA will complete this
investigation, which we plan to do as a future work.
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7 Discussion
This paper fall in the class of hybrid mechanisms in the peer grading literature that use
partial ground truth and peer evaluation. However, it also uses an additional degree of
freedom that the true scores are revealed at an additional cost, and our results show that it
indeed provides an advantage over the classical peer grading mechanisms. In particular, this
additional information helps distinguishing inaccuracy of a grader from her manipulation,
which is an important method of peer grading in our view. Among other benefits, use of a
constant number of probe papers helps the grading method scale for very large size of classes.
To reduce the number of regrading requests, we may increase the number of assignments per
grader. However, the behavioral aspect of peer graders when put against a mechanism
cannot be predicted with either simulations or dataset based experiments. Therefore, a
natural follow-up of this work will be a human subject experiment with TRUPEQA and other
mechanisms to understand its efficacy in practice.
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A Calculations for TRUPEQA: continuous scores
A.1 Calculation of ei(y˜
(i)
Pi
, yPi):
ei(y˜
(i)
Pi
, yPi) is the Maximum Likelihood estimate for (bi, τi)
ei(y˜
(i)
Pi
, yPi) = argmax
bi,τi
f(yPi, y˜
(i)
Pi
|bi, τi)
= argmax
bi,τi
f(yPi|µ, γ)f(y˜(i)Pi |yPi, bi, τi)
= argmax
bi,τi
f(y˜
(i)
Pi
|yPi, bi, τi)
= argmax
bi,τi
[
Πj∈Pif(y˜
(i)
j |yj, bi, τi)
]
= argmax
bi,τi
[
Πj∈Pi
√
τi√
2π
exp
(
− τi
2
(y˜
(i)
j − (yj + bi))2
)]
= argmax
bi,τi
(
Πj∈Pi
√
τi
)
exp
(∑
j∈Pi
−τi
2
(y˜
(i)
j − (yj + bi))2
)
Let h(bi, τi) =
(
Πj∈Pi
√
τi
)
exp
(∑
j∈Pi
− τi
2
(y˜
(i)
j − (yj + bi))2
)
Now the task is to find (bi, τi) that maximizes h(bi, τi) or log[h(bi, τi)]
log [h(bi, τi)] = const. +
∑
j∈Pi
log(
√
τi) +
(∑
j∈Pi
−τi
2
(y˜
(i)
j − (yj + bi))2
)
= const. +
|Pi|
2
log(τi) +
(∑
j∈Pi
−τi
2
(y˜
(i)
j − (yj + bi))2
)
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Equating the first derivatives to 0:
∂ log[h(bi, τi)]
∂bi
=
(∑
j∈Pi
τi(y˜
(i)
j − (yj + bi))
)
∂ log[h(bi, τi)]
∂bi
= 0⇒
(∑
j∈Pi
τi(y˜
(i)
j − (yj + bi))
)
= 0
⇒ bi =
∑
j∈Pi
(y˜
(i)
j − yj)
|Pi|
∂ log[h(bi, τi)]
∂τi
=
|Pi|
2τi
− 1
2
(∑
j∈Pi
(y˜
(i)
j − (yj + bi))2
)
∂ log[h(bi, τi)]
∂τi
= 0⇒ |Pi|
2τi
− 1
2
(∑
j∈Pi
(y˜
(i)
j − (yj + bi))2
)
= 0
⇒ τi = |Pi|∑
j∈Pi
(y˜
(i)
j − (yj + bi))2
Checking the double derivative values on roots of first derivative:
∂2 log[h(bi, τi)]
∂τ 2i
= −|Pi|
2τ 2i
≤ 0
∂2 log[h(bi, τi)]
∂b2i
= −
∑
j∈Pi
τi ≤ 0
Hence, ei(y˜
(i)
Pi
, yPi) = (bi, τi) =
(∑
j∈Pi
(y˜
(i)
j −yj)
|Pi|
, |Pi|∑
j∈Pi
(y˜
(i)
j −(yj+bi))
2
)
A.2 Calculation of f(yj|y˜G(j)j , bG(j), τG(j), µ, γ):
f(yj|y˜G(j)j , bG(j), τG(j), µ, γ) =
f(yj|µ, γ)f(y˜G(j)j |yj, bG(j), τG(j))∫
yj
f(yj|µ, γ)f(y˜G(j)j |yj, bG(j), τG(j))
∝ f(yj|µ, γ)f(y˜G(j)j |yj, bG(j), τG(j))
∝ f(yj|µ, γ)Πi∈G(j)f(y˜(i)j |yj, bi, τi)
∝ exp
(
− 1
2
γ(yj − µ)2 +
∑
i∈G(j)
(
− 1
2
τi(y˜
(i)
j − (yj + bi)
)2)
∝ exp
(
− 1
2
[
γ(yj − µ)2 +
∑
i∈G(j)
τi
(
y˜
(i)
j − (yj + bi)
)2])
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The expression inside the exponent is quadratic we thus complete the square, obtaining:
γ(yj − µ)2 +
∑
i∈G(j)
τi
(
y˜
(i)
j − (yj + bi)
)2
= const. + γ(y2j − 2yjµ) +
∑
i∈G(j)
τi
(
(yj + bi)
2 − 2y˜(i)j (yj + bi)
)
= const. +
(
γ +
∑
i∈G(j)
τi
)
y2j − 2
(
γµ+
∑
i∈G(j)
τi(y˜
(i)
j − bi)
)
yj,
= const. +R
(
yj − 1
R
(
γµ+
∑
i∈G(j)
τi(y˜
(i)
j − bi)
))2
(where R = γ +
∑
i∈G(j)
τi)
Therefore the resultant distribution is Gaussian:
f(yj|y˜G(j)j , bG(j), τG(j), µ, γ) ∼ N
(
γµ+
∑
i∈G(j) τi(y˜
(i)
j − bi)
γ +
∑
i∈G(j) τi
,
1
γ +
∑
i∈G(j) τi
)
E
yj |y˜
G(j)
j
,bG(j),τG(j)
(yj) =
γµ+
∑
i∈G(j) τi(y˜
(i)
j − bi)
γ +
∑
i∈G(j) τi
(13)
A.3 Calculation of r∗j (y˜
G(j)
j , y˜
G(j)
Pj
, yPj):
R(xj , yj) = −(xj − yj)2 where xj is the estimated score and yj is the true score for paper j.
r∗j (y˜
G(j)
j , y˜
G(j)
Pj
, yPj) = argmax
xj∈S
∫
yj
f(yj|y˜G(j)j , bG(j), τG(j))R(xj , yj)
where (bi, τi) = ei(y˜
(i)
Pi
, yPi) ∀i ∈ G(j)
= argmax
xj∈S
[
−
∫
yj
f(yj|y˜G(j)j , bG(j), τG(j))(xj − yj)2
]
= argmin
xj∈S
∫
yj
f(yj|y˜G(j)j , bG(j), τG(j))(xj − yj)2
Let g(xj) =
∫
yj
f(yj|y˜G(j)j , bG(j), τG(j))(xj − yj)2
Hence we have to find xj that minimizes g(xj)
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∂g(xj)
∂xj
=
∂
∂xj
[∫
yj
f(yj|y˜G(j)j , bG(j), τG(j))(xj − yj)2
]
=
∫
yj
∂
∂xj
[
f(yj|y˜G(j)j , bG(j), τG(j))(xj − yj)2
]
= 2
∫
yj
f(yj|y˜G(j)j , bG(j), τG(j))(xj − yj)
= 2xj
∫
yj
f(yj|y˜G(j)j , bG(j), τG(j))− 2
∫
yj
yjf(yj|y˜G(j)j , bG(j), τG(j))
= 2xj − 2Eyj |y˜G(j)j ,bG(j),τG(j)yj
∂g(xj)
∂xj
= 0⇒ xj = Eyj |y˜G(j)j ,bG(j),τG(j)yj
∂2g(xj)
∂x2j
= 2 ≥ 0
Since second derivative ≥ 0 and first derivative is 0, hence xj = Eyj |y˜G(j)j ,bG(j),τG(j)yj is global
minima
r∗j (y˜
G(j)
j , y˜
G(j)
Pj
, yPj) = Eyj |y˜G(j)j ,bG(j),τG(j)
yj =
γµ+
∑
i∈G(j) τi(y˜
(i)
j −bi)
γ+
∑
i∈G(j) τi
from eq(1)
B Calculations for TRUPEQA: discrete scores
1. Calculation of ei(y˜
(i)
Pi
, yPi):
ei(y˜
(i)
Pi
, yPi) = argmax
qi∈Q
f(yPi, y˜
(i)
Pi
|qi)
= argmax
qi∈Q
f(yPi)f(y˜
(i)
Pi
|yPi, qi)
= argmax
qi∈Q
f(y˜
(i)
Pi
|yPi, qi)
= argmax
qi∈Q
[
Πj∈Pif(y˜
(i)
j |yj, qi)
]
= argmax
qi∈Q
[
Πj∈Pi
exp(− qi|y˜
(i)
j −yj |
m
)∑m
z=0
[
exp(− qi|z−yj|
m
)
]
]
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The second equality arises because f(yPi) is independent of qi.
2. Calculation of r∗j (y˜
G(j)
j , y˜
G(j)
Pj
, yPj):
R(xj , yj) = −(xj − yj)2 where xj is the estimated score and yj is the true score for paper j.
r∗j (y˜
G(j)
j , y˜
G(j)
Pj
, yPj) = argmax
xj∈S
∑
yj∈S
f(yj|y˜G(j)j , qG(j))R(xj , yj)
where qi = ei(y˜
(i)
Pi
, yPi) ∀i ∈ G(j)
= argmax
xj∈S
[
−
∑
yj∈S
f(yj|y˜G(j)j , qG(j))(xj − yj)2
]
= argmin
xj∈S
[∑
yj∈S
[
f(yj|y˜G(j)j , qG(j))(xj − yj)2
]]
= argmin
xj∈S
[∑
yj∈S
[
f(yj)f(y˜
G(j)
j |yj, qG(j))(xj − yj)2
]]
= argmin
xj∈S
[∑
yj∈S
[
f(yj)
[
Πi∈G(j)exp
(
− qi|yj − y˜
(i)
j |
m
)]
(xj − yj)2
]]
C Calculations for Gibbs: discrete scores
The pseudo code for Gibbs sampling is
⊲ Generate an initial assignment to all unobserved variables, yj, qi for every true
grades and graders quality.
⊲ for t = 1, 2, . . . , T :
– For each true score yj:
∗ Sample y : f(yj = k|y˜G(j)j , qG(j))
∝ (f(yj = k))
[
Πi∈G(j) exp
(
− qi|k − y˜
(i)
j |
m
)]
∗ yj ← y
– For each quality qi:
∗ Sample q : f(qi = k|y˜(i)Pi , yPi)
∝ (f(qi = k))
[
Πj∈Pi exp
(
− qi|yj − y˜
(i)
j |
m
)]
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∗ qi ← q
– Save Sample ζ t ← (y, q)
⊲ Return Samples from ζB, ζ (B+1), ...., ζT for some large enough B.
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